Disarmament and Arms Control

There is no alternative to peace. War in our time has been an anachronism. Whatever the case in the past, war in future can serve no useful purpose. War needs no documentation to prove its horrors. People have constantly been in the search of alternatives to war and approaches to peace. Despite two world wars in the present century and the impending horror of the nuclear holocaust, the frequency of war has not decreased. The two world wars have frightened man badly and in the very imagination of the Third World War one finds then end of mankind. It must be recognized that war today has potentialities for destruction beyond the range of human comprehension. Among the many ways by which the war may be prevented the most important is disarmament. In regard to approaches to peace, armament and disarmament, both are suggested as ways by which the war may be prevented. The supporters of the armament theory argue that the more frightful war became, “the less likelihood there was of its becoming a reality.” But this theory lands in very dangerous situation as the creation of cast armament in itself calls for a condition midway between war and peace. Moving in the direction of armaments will be going a long way on the path towards war.

Meaning of Disarmament- Disarmament literally means the reduction or elimination of armaments. The term ‘Disarmament’ is used in very general sense and as such it connotes the idea of limitation, or control, or reduction, or elimination of armaments. According to Morgenthau, “Disarmament is the reduction or elimination of certain or all armaments for the purpose of ending the armament race.” Disarmament has become such a wide word that any matter relating to the regulation of armaments comes within its meaning Kinds of Disarmament;

1. General and local disarmament: In General Disarmament, all or most of the great powers participate. Examples are the Washington Treaty of 1922 for the limitation of naval armaments, signed by all major naval powers, and the World Disarmament Conference of 1932. We refer to Local Disarmament when only limited numbers of nations are involved. The Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 between the United States and Canada is an example of this type.

2. Quantitative and Qualitative Disarmament: Quantitative Disarmament refers to an overall reduction of armaments of most or all types. This was the goal of most nations represented at the world conference in 1932. Qualitative disarmament aims at the reduction or abolition of only certain special types of armaments as was discussed by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations.

3. Total Disarmament: Total disarmament aims at complete elimination of armaments. There would be no weapon of any kind whatsoever.

4. Disarmament and Arms control: Disarmament is concerned with the reduction or elimination of armament, but this applies only to the control of existing weapons. Arms control is concerned
with regulating the armaments race in the future. As such, disarmament is concerned with the control of existing weapons and arms control with that of future weapons. Disarmament seeks to control armaments and arms control tries to check the armaments race.

**Need for Disarmament**

1. **The prevention of War and the Establishment of Peace:** According to Morgenthau, “It is believed that, by doing away with one of the typical manifestations of the struggle for power on the international scene, one can do away with the typical effects of that struggle; International anarchy and war.” Disarmament is considered to be the most effective means of preventing war and guaranteeing peace. It is commonly believed that unless there is disarmament, war and destruction cannot be checked. The only direct cause of war according to disarmament approach is the existence of armaments.

   It is argued that war results from armaments and, therefore, it can be checked only by disarmament. Thus the belief that arms cause war is fundamental to the theory of disarmament. The amassing of armaments and their instant availability make war probable and feasible or, as Clause asserts, even tempting for statement to plunge into war. The theory of disarmament proceeds on the assumption that by limiting armaments, the nations would be deprived of the very means of fighting. When a nation increases its military strength, other nationals develop feelings of fear and insecurity. This leads to belligerence on the part of other nations and they also seek to increase their military strength. I realms of arms, one nation’s common sense is another nation’s high blood pressure. Thus develops war hysteria. Sometimes, in anticipation of an attack a nation is acting in self defense. Armaments make the national outlook aggressive and militaristic. While the armaments encourage conflict and war, it would be incorrect to argue that it is the sole cause of war. Complete disarmament would, however, lead to peace by eliminating the very means to fight. According to Cohen, “Armaments aggravate tension and fear among nations. By releasing tension and fear disarmament should facilities and strengthens the process of peaceful settlement.

2. **Nuclear Threat** - The threat of nuclear weapons and even a very remote possibility of a nuclear war have made the problem of disarmament all the more important. A nuclear war will lead to total destruction. But at the same time the view has been expressed that the fear of total destruction is so great that a nuclear war would never occur. Any war may turn ultimately into a nuclear war and the very threat of a nuclear war has restrained the nations from going to war in the nuclear age. If disarmament, both of nuclear as well as conventional weapons, is possible, way may be prevented.

3. **Economic** - A very important argument in favour of disarmament is economic. The very important argument which are allocated for military purposes by the nations are a broad indication of what is denied to other avenues of public and private expenditure. If nations had not expended their means for military purposes, they could obviously have put the resources so consumed to many other uses. The military expenditures affect both the immediate consumption as well as future economic growth. The
path of economic growth is barred. The nations are deprived of the mutual economic aid they could otherwise receive from one another. International trade and exchange of technological “know how” have been impeded. If there were no arms race, trade and other exchanges would almost certainly be easier. A halt to the arms race could by itself be an important stimulus towards the relaxation of other existing barriers.

4. Social argument- The economic case for disarmament is closely linked with the social case. Military expenditure also has profound social consequences. The problem of poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, housing and that of raising standard of living is not only confined to the developing countries. These problems in some measure are also present in the rich countries. Military expenditures absorb resources which would otherwise be released for providing social services. The military expenditure for the world as a whole is about two and half times the estimated total of the publicity financed health expenditure. A rough calculation suggests that all medical research in the world consumes only about 4,000 million dollars as compared to some 25,000 million dollars spent on military research and development. Nuclear tests and explosions are having their polluting effects on the physical environment and thus bring environmental devastation.

5. Political- Armaments cause international suspicious and fears and they poison relations in the political sphere. Political differences become sharpened by the fear and suspicion which the amassing of armaments generates. The amassing of armaments also increases the possibility that force might be resorted to as a means of dealing with international problems. Armaments, which are supposed to provide security, in fact, provoke the political difference. It should be borne in mind that war is not an answer to any of man's imminent problems. The spirit of militarism is opposed to the spirit of democracy and peaceful progress in the world.

6. Psychological- A war condition has a strange psychological influence over the minds of the people. Everybody feels that he lived in a world in which violence has become a common place, and which is stocked with sufficient lethal to create a psychological background of uncertainty, fear and anxiety. Some western social psychologists have expressed the view that the arms race and the horrors of war have developed a belief in the younger generation that world is a irrational place in which the improvement of society is a hopeless cause.

Hindrances in the way of Disarmament-

1. The problem of disarmament is closely related to the problem of security. According to Palmer and Perkins, There has long been a consciousness of an inverse relationship between disarmament and security. Unless some system can be evolved whereby nations will actually be more secure with less armed strength, disarmament will indeed remain a ‘pipe dream’. International tension and the mutual
fear among the nations develop in them a feeling of insecurity. So long as the nations are not assured of their security, any effort for disarmament would meet with failure. No guarantee can be provided to nations in view of the nature of the present international society. In the conditions like this, every nation is bound to depend upon its own power for its security.

2. Another hindrance in the way of disarmament is the fear and mutual distrust. As a result, every nation views with suspicion the disarmament proposals put forth by others. Every nation feels suspicious about the intentions of others nations that while it may effect a reduction in its armaments, other may not do so. This mistrust functions in two ways, “it hampers initial agreement and it might lead to the break down should a disarmament scheme be put into operation.” But as Prof. Schleicher observes, “If there were perfect trust between nations, arms would be unnecessary and disarmament would but be the problem.” So the basic problem of disarmament is that there is lack of mutual trust among the nations.

3. No nation expresses itself against disarmament as such, but it views any disarmament plan from the point of view of its national interest. During disarmament negotiations such conditions are placed by some of the participants, which are not acceptable to others. As a result, the disarmament conferences fail. In fact, the nations lack the real desire for disarmament and that is why they put such condition which may not be acceptable to others. As a result the disarmament conferences fail.

4. The developments after the second’s world war divided the world into two blocs, and that gave birth to so call cold war. Every nation is concerned about its security because of unstable balance of power. Armaments are the result of certain psychological factors. So long as these factors persist, disarmament seems to be a distant possibility. And disarmament proposal is, therefore, considered by the nations only in the contest of present international system.

5. In the realm of armaments, the super powers have achieved the maximum limit. In other words, they have gained such a potential capacity in armaments that it would not be worthwhile to go any further. Today both the USA and the USSR are in the possession of overkill capacity. It is now in their interest to put a halt to arms race. But the nations which are much behind in the arms race want disarmament only when they have reached a rough parity in arms with the super powers. They consider the power equality as the ideal situation for disbarment. Since this situation is highly improbable, disarmament also appears improbable in the near future.

6. One important hindrance in the way of disarmament is with regard to the ratio among the armaments of different nations after a reduction in the armaments has been effected. Every nation wants to be superior of disarmament to others. This question is always the first on the agenda of disarmament to others. This question is always the first on the agenda of disarmament conference and commissions as so what should be the nation among the armaments of different nations and within that ration how different types and quantities of armaments are to be allotted to different nations.
Effort for Disarmament- The enormous destruction caused by the Second World War roused the conscience of the world. Fearing that another war may completely wipe out the human race, nations of the world started making more eager efforts to regulate the arms race. The UN charter laid great emphasis on the regulation of armaments. Article-11(c) while directing the General Assembly to consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security authorized it to make recommendations to the member state regarding the general principles governing disarmament and regulation of armaments. Article-26 provides that in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion of armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.

The Security Council shall be responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of system for the regulation of armaments. According to Article-47, “there shall be a military staff committee to advice and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament.” For ensuring an effective disarmament process the United Nations Organization undertook the following steps;

Atomic Energy Commission- In 1945 the UN general assembly setup an Atomic energy Commission to make specific proposals for the control of atomic energy for peaceful purpose and for bringing about the total prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The commission was expected to enquire into all aspects of the problem and make recommendations. The commission was subordinate to the Security Council and was expected to submit its reports and recommendations to it.

Commission on Conventional Armaments- In pursuance of the General Assembly resolution of December 1946, the Security Council set up a commission which was expected to prepare and submit to the council within three months proposals for “the general regulation and reduction at armaments and armed forces,” and to suggest practical and effective safeguards. It may be noted that this commission was specifically debarred from discussing issues concerning atomic weapons and their control.

Disarmament Commission- On the suggestion of the American President Truman that the two disarmament Commission should be merged, the General Assembly setup a committee of twelve members (eleven members of security council and Canada) to report the ways and means where by the work of the two commissions could be combined. The committee recommended the merger of the two commissions. The recommendations were accepted by the General Assembly and a Disarmament Commission was created on in 1952. It was to consist of all the members of the Security Council plus Canada. In 1957 General Assembly increased the strength of the Disarmament Commission to 14. In 1958, all the members of UN were included as its members. The Commission was requested to prepare a draft treaty for the regulation of conventional as well as atomic armaments. The Commission took up a
number of issues concerning arms and their reduction but failed to make much progress because of the divergence of views among the super powers.

**Atoms for Peace Plan** - In 1953, president Eisenhower of USA came out with a plan for peaceful use of atoms. It suggested the establishment of an international pool of fissionable material to be used for peaceful purposes. This plan popularly known as atoms for peace plan appealed to all those powers that possessed atomic energy material to contribute the same to the Atomic energy Commission under the United Nations.

**The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)** - The intense nuclear proliferation and testing promoted efforts to limit the proliferation and development of nuclear weapons. The real progress on a test ban between the great powers came in 1963 when the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was adopted. The PTBT banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater and in space; however, nuclear weapons testing continued underground. As a result, the PTBT was a significant instrument to address environmental issues rather than disarmament.

**Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)** - The treaty of Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons was signed on July, 1968 and came into force in 1970. 190 countries have joined the Treaty, including the five States recognized under the Treaty as possessing nuclear weapons. The five nuclear states under the treaty are; China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Three countries, which have or are suspected of having nuclear weapons programmes, are currently outside the NPT. These countries are India, Israel and Pakistan. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in 2003. The NPT stipulates that States Parties meet every five years to assess the implementation of the Treaty.

The 1995 meeting agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely. The NPT has three “pillars” or main areas:

1) Non-proliferation (stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology),
2) Disarmament (getting rid of existing nuclear arsenals), and
3) The right to peacefully use nuclear energy (including access to nuclear technology, which is the right of all States Parties to the NPT).

Since coming into force in 1970, the NPT has largely been successful, although not perfect, at containing the spread of nuclear weapons globally. Efforts at nuclear disarmament by the five nuclear weapon States have been uneven and incomplete. The United States and the Russian Federation, which possess the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, have substantially reduced their nuclear arsenals since the Cold War. Global nuclear arsenals peaked in the mid 1980s at around 70,000 warheads. Today the total number of warheads is around 23,000, with nearly 8,400 of those
operational. But efforts to focus on further reductions largely stalled during the early 2000s, with relations between the Russian Federation and the United States becoming increasingly strained.

The third pillar of the NPT relates to the inalienable right of all Parties to the NPT to develop research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The Parties also undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The parties of the treaty are encouraged to consider the needs of the developing parts of the world in matters of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

**Biological Weapons Convention**- An effort to check the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons was made in 1972 by signing the “convention on the prohibition of the development, production and Toxin weapons and on their destruction.” The convention was signed in 1972 and came into force in 1975. The convention impressed the need of achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction.

**The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty**- The ABM Treaty, signed in 1972, prohibits the use of defensive systems that might give an advantage to one side in a nuclear war. The Mutually Assured Destruction scenario was invoked here to assure that each nation had enough weapons to survive a nuclear attack and therefore have the ability to annihilate the other. Their rationale was that as long as both sides remained defenseless, in this respect, neither country would dare attack the other.

**Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT-I and SALT-II)**- Amidst the Cold War, a series of treaties was issued under the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty to curtail the build up of nuclear weapons. SALT-I, as it is commonly known, was the first of the Strategic Arms Limitation talks between the USSR and the US the Communist leader Leonid Brezhnev, who was the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, met with US President Richard Nixon in November of 1969 to come up with a treaty that would contain the arms race. The negotiations lasted until January of 1972, and by May, 26 of that same year the treaty was finalized. The two treaties signed that day were the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty or ABM, and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Provisions of the ABM treaty included regulation of antiballistic missiles that could possibly be used to destroy incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s) launched by other countries. Also each side was limited to only one launching area for ABM’s and 100 interceptor missiles. This treaty was ratified by the US Senate on August 3, 1972. The Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was to have a five year duration that would freeze the number of strategic ballistic missiles, such as the ICBM’s and the submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM’s), at the current 1972 level.
In late 1972, negotiations began for SALT-II and continued for seven years. Finally on June 18, 1979, in Vienna, Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter signed the SALT-II treaty. Since the two countries had developed different strategies, with the USSR focusing on larger warheads and the US concentrating on missiles with a greater accuracy, specifications of the previous treaties had to be changed. SALT-II set more specific regulations on the different missiles. Limits were set on the number of strategic launchers, and the various types of missiles. Each side was limited to no more than 2,400 weapons systems.

SALT-II was sent to the Senate to be ratified, but due to tensions between the two countries, Carter pushed the treaty aside. In the years following, some of the standards set in SALT-II were voluntarily being observed by the two sides, but the treaty was never ratified. Later negotiations took place in Geneva that was known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks or START. Tensions continued up until the end of the Cold War, but war never broke out again and the race to stockpile weapons finally ended in the early 1990’s.

**Helsinki conference, 1975**- The Helsinki Agreement is a declaration adopted by 35 sovereign states in 1975. The declaration focused on improving the relations between Communist governments and the Western world, with a goal of reducing Cold War tensions. The Helsinki Agreement was the final act produced by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The conference was held in Helsinki, Finland, in July and August of 1975.

Thirty-five states signed the Helsinki Agreement on August 1, 1975. Signatories included the United States of America, Canada and every European state with the exception of Albania and Andorra (whose heads of state were absent). A significant part of the Helsinki Agreement was the consensus among participating nations to promote human rights, adherence to international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. This was seen as a concession made by the Soviet Union to the West in exchange for the recognition of postwar borders.

**The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, START-I and START-II**- START-I and START-II were designed to reduce the weapons that Russia and the US have. While the major nuclear powers have agreed to eliminate their nuclear arsenal at a UN review of the NPT, it remains to be seen how much of that will be rhetoric and how much real political will there will be to follow it through. Unfortunately, the nuclear weapons states, and particularly the United States, seem to have made virtually zero progress in the past five years. Despite its pledges to do otherwise, the United States has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; opposed a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty; substituted the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which is fully reversible, for the START treaties; scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, opening the door for deployment of missile defenses and moves toward placing weapons in outer space; kept nuclear weapons at the center of its security policies, including research to create new nuclear weapons; and demonstrated no political will toward the elimination of its nuclear arsenal.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) - The CTBT was designed to prevent testing of nuclear weapons and hence reduce the chance of an arms race. It bans all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September, 1996. The CTBT has achieved near universal adherence, however, Article-XIV of the Treaty requires ratification by 44 named states, before the Treaty can enter into force.

After cold war- Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991, newly sovereign Russia undertook efforts to drastically reduce its nuclear and conventional armed forces through unilateral actions and agreements with the United States. The newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan inherited some of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal but quickly pursued complete nuclear disarmament; all three became nuclear free by 1996. In 1992 an informal agreement (START-II) was reached between the United States and Russia that would further drastically reduce each country’s strategic nuclear forces over a period extending into the early 21st century.

In the 1990s the United States and Russia played major roles in the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), which prohibited the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and called for the destruction of existing stocks within 10 years. The convention, drafted by the 39 countries of the Conference on Disarmament and entering into force in 1997, reaffirmed the Geneva Protocol of 1925, restated the prohibitions of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the Washington treaties (1921–22) against the use of poisonous gases, and added a ban on bacteriological warfare; some 150 states were party to the agreement by the early 21st century. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which would prohibit all forms of nuclear explosive testing, had been signed by more than 165 states and ratified by more than 100 by the early 21st century but had failed to enter into force because some of the 44 states whose signatures were required for its enactment (including the United States, China, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan) chose not to sign. In 1997, as a result of efforts led by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a treaty prohibiting the use of antipersonnel mines was negotiated; it went into effect in 1999, and, by the early 21st century, nearly 150 countries had signed it, though China, Russia, and the United States had not.

In June 2002, despite intense international opposition, the United States, citing fundamental changes in its security needs since the 1970s, withdrew from the ABM Treaty to pursue a national missile defence system designed to protect the country against nuclear attack. The United States subsequently offered to share defence technology with Russia and cover some of its allies, but the Russian response was lukewarm. Although Russia opposed the US decision, its reaction was restrained; in May 2002, five months after the United States announced its intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the two countries signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which committed each side to reducing its store of strategic nuclear warheads. Russia subsequently announced that it would no longer be bound by the START-II agreement, which its parliament had ratified in 2000.
In May 2008, representatives of more than 100 countries met in Dublin to conclude an agreement that banned the use of cluster bombs, which release dozens of smaller bombs (bomblets) over a wide area. The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), a network of non-governmental organizations including the ICBL and Amnesty International, had spearheaded efforts to prohibit the devices on the grounds that unexploded bomblets present a lethal risk to civilians long after a conflict has ended. The Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted despite opposition from the largest manufacturers and stock pillars of the weapons (including China, Russia, and the United States). It was signed in December, 2008 and entered into force on Aug. 1, 2010.

**India’s Nuclear Policy**- India gained freedom in the nuclear age. It was a time when the entire world witnessed the havoc caused by the atom bomb which America dropped on two Japanese cities. The nuclear arms race followed by the Second World War threatened the existence of mankind on the earth. The mad race among several states to acquire nuclear weapons resulted into vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. By 1960s five states-America, USSR, England, France and China acquired the potential do develop the nuclear weapons.

In a world replete with hundreds of nuclear weapons, India decided to adopt peaceful nuclear policy on the one hand and demanded complete nuclear disarmament on the other hand. After independence India embarked on comprehensive economic development programme and decided to harness nuclear energy for the socio-economic development of India. The then political leadership of India encouraged Indian scientists to develop indigenous nuclear technology for developmental work.

**India and Nuclear Disarmament**- India has maintained an impeccable record on non-proliferation. Since independence India has been committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament in spirit and letter. The first prime minister of India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made it abundantly clear immediately after the independence that India had no plan to develop nuclear weapons and the India’s nuclear programme is meant for peace and development. India’s opposition to nuclear weapons and all forms of competition was most visible in 1950s itself. India supported the UN Nuclear Energy Commission’s proposal in the early 1950s for the control on the use of nuclear energy. While supporting the proposal, India appealed the world community for limiting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only and the elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1954 India appealed to the international community to ban all nuclear tests. India was the first country to call to an end to all nuclear testing. India supported and become party to 1963’s Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In the late 1960s the General Assembly of the UN passed a unanimous resolution for disarmament and eradication of all nuclear weapons. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1968 is based on the same resolution. However India refused to sign on this treaty due to its own set of reservations against the provisions of NPT. In 1974 India conducted its first nuclear test which is popularly known as peaceful nuclear explosion. Even after the nuclear test Indian did not embark on nuclear weapons programme and continued to work for nuclear disarmament. In 1978, India proposed negotiations for an international
convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In 1982 India called for a "nuclear freeze" i.e. prohibition on the production of fissile material for weapons, on production of nuclear weapons, and related delivery systems. In 1988 the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed an action plan for global and regional nuclear disarmament in the phased manner at UN General Assembly. The plan proposed regional disarmament along with global. The plan titled as Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear weapon free and Non-Violent World Order. The Action Plan was designed for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, in three stages by 2010. As per the provisions of the plan there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminating nuclear weapons in stages, by the year 2010 at the latest. Further, all nuclear weapon States must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be part of the process. The Plan called for establishing a Comprehensive Global Security System under the aegis of the United Nations. Some Experts believes that the action plan was an Indian attempt to control and contain Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Although India conducted nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May, 1998 and declared itself as a nuclear weapons state, it immediately announced a self imposed moratorium on further nuclear tests. India also declared that it will maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence for its security.

**Heritage of Nuclear Ambiguity** - Several analysts observe that the Indian nuclear policy is characterized by ambiguity. The post independent political leadership of India was ambivalent about the requirement of nuclear weapons to protect India's strategic interests in an anarchic world. This ambiguity emanated from paradoxical policies. For example;

- On the hand India exhibited repugnance towards nuclear weaponry and called for global abolition of nuclear weapons on other hand India sustained capability to produce fissile material.
- India called for the creation of an institutional structure at the global level to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons and at the same time rejected any external political or legal restrain on its right to develop nuclear weapon.
- Although India kept its nuclear option open, it kept it in suspended animation. The plans for construction nuclear bomb was neither expressed nor foreclosed.
- Although India conducted nuclear test and demonstrated its ability to make nuclear bomb, India refrained from developing it. India took almost twenty four years after its first nuclear step to construct a nuclear bomb.

**Nuclear Debate in India** - India’s nuclear policy evolved through a series of debate on the use of nuclear energy. Right from 1950s to 1990s there were schools of scientists, strategic analysts, politicians who either supported or discouraged the use of nuclear energy for evil purposes. During the cold war era, the nuclear debate in India revolved around the point whether India should go for weaponization or not. The actors in the debate were the then scientist and the political leaders. Immediately after the independence, Dr. Homi Bhabha, first chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission proposed that
India should either seek security guarantee from the nuclear weapons states or develop its own nuclear weapons. Even the nuclear advisers of Nehru suggested him to go for nuclear if the goal of global disarmament were not realized. However, these perceptions of India’s nuclear scientists were not shared by the then political leaders. India’s post independent political leadership especially Nehru had a strong aversion to nuclear weapons. Hence he reportedly turned down the proposal of Dr. Bhabha and other nuclear scientist for India’s nuclerisation. While articulating its stand on nuclear policy in 1957 Nehru observed, “I think I can say with some assurance on behalf of any future government of India that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes.” The debate on same issue continued in the post cold war era also. In the post cold war era as maintained by Stephan Cohen 160 there were three groups or school of thoughts who debated India’s nuclear policy.

The first group was consisted of neoliberals who emphasized on economic reform and economic growth and argued that an assertive nuclear and foreign policy could hamper the Indian efforts for economic progress. The second group represented the Nehruvian legacy of strategic restrain and emphasized on freedom of action in nuclear area. The third group mostly comprised of the rightist elements advocated a strong defence and development of nuclear bomb for India.

The nuclear debate in India remained continued even after India’s decision of nuclerisation. The issues in debate were the strategic implications of weaponization on Indo-Pak relations and India’s self proclaimed stand on moratorium on nuclear tests. After the 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, several Indian and foreign strategic experts stated that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons as a bargaining tool to advance its goals in J & K. At the same time some emphasized the enhanced perils of further war between India and Pakistan. After the November, 2008 attack on India, there is growing demand by few nuclear experts that India should go for further nuclear tests in view of increasing threat from the Pakistan and china. There is also call for reconsidering India’s no first use principle. These demands gather space with the report of US intelligence agencies confirming that Pakistan is having around 90 nuclear weapons and is continuously producing fissile material.

Compulsions of Nuclerisation-

1. Deteriorating Security Environment in South Asia- In the post-cold war era the security environment in south Asia was deteriorated due to several developments. The increasing security threats both from china and Pakistan created strategic problems for India. Both states possessed nuclear weapons and put India in a precarious situation where India was forced to develop comparable capabilities. India pointed out the Chinese nuclear aid to Pakistan and how an overt nuclear state like china is helping Pakistan to become a covert nuclear state.

2. The China Threat- The roots of India’s quest for acquiring the nuclear weapons lie in the nuclerisation of china, Chinese threat perception, and China-Pak nuclear nexus. India’s nuclear policy
had undergone a significant change with the first nuclear test by China in 1964. After the defeat by China in 1962 followed by its nuclear tests the national security threat for India had naturally inflated which led to India's first nuclear test in 1974. The decision for second nuclear test in 1998 was also influenced by the China factor. The growing military power of China and its covert hostility with India mainly due to the unresolved border issue mounted pressure on India.

3. China-Pakistan Nuclear Nexus- Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan is an issue of serious concern for India and also instrumental in nuclear proliferation in south Asia. China is believed to have assisted Pakistan in building its nuclear programmes since 1970s. The Chinese assistance to Pakistan comprises supply of highly enriched uranium, ring magnets necessary for processing the uranium among others. China has also reportedly trained Pakistani engineers and scientists. In the early 1990s China provided Pakistan with nuclear capable M-11 missiles that have a range of 186 miles. China has also provided short range missile technology to Pakistan. The Pakistani nuclear bomb as observed in several intelligence reports is based on the blueprint supplied by China.

4. Discriminatory nuclear regime- Discriminatory nuclear regime of NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and CTBT (Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty) created by nuclear haves to maintain their monopoly in the nuclear area is also one of the reasons compelled India to go for nuclear. The nuclear regime created by the NPT and CTBT Treaties failed to offer a universal mechanism for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. These treaties were designed to legalize the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear haves and prevent other to go for nuclear.

India’s Nuclear Doctrine- India formulated a draft doctrine to guide its nuclear weapons immediately after the nuclear tests of 1998. India’s nuclear doctrine has been designed to make India a responsible nuclear state and aim to provide minimum credible deterrence to India. India’s nuclear doctrine is defensive in nature which makes it clear that India is committed to no first use of nuclear weapons principle and India will not use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons state. The doctrine further clears that the nuclear command and control system in India is under civilian control. The salient features of India’s nuclear doctrine are as under;

1) Civilian control over nuclear weapons- The nuclear command and control system in India is under the civilian rule.
2) Emphasis on developing a Minimum Credible Deterrence. This principle provides flexibility in deciding the number of nuclear weapons India should possess. India will not engage in arms race.
3) No-first-use- nuclear weapons will be used only for retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory. This principle is based on the theory of deterrence and helps to reduce possibility of war.
4) The nuclear retaliation will be colossal and designed to inflict massive damage. India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon state.

5) India will observe strict control on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technology. India will participate in the fissile material cut off treaty negotiations.

6) India will put moratorium on nuclear tests. In 1998 itself the then PM of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared that India did not required nuclear tests and under took a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests.

7) India will remain committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

8) India will built effective, enduring diverse forces based upon a nuclear tread of air-craft, mobile land based missiles and sea based assets.

Indian Stand on NPT and CTBT- Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; The NPT is the most widely accepted arms control agreement. The Treaty was opened for signature on 01 July, 1968. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of US ratification on 05 March, 1970. The important provisions of the treaty are as under;

1) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) necessitates the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or their technology to any non-nuclear weapon state.

2) Non-nuclear weapon States Parties undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

3) All nuclear materials in peaceful civil facilities under the jurisdiction of the state must be declared to the IAEA, the IAEA may consult with the state regarding special inspections within or outside declared facilities.

Pursuant to the provisions of the treaty on May 11, 1995 more than 170 countries attended the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in New York. Three important decisions were taken at the summit;

1) The NPT was extended for an indefinite duration and without conditions.

2) Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament were worked out to guide the parties to the treaty in the next phase of its implementation.

3) An enhanced review process was established for future review conferences.

4) Finally, a resolution endorsed the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle-East. It is important to note that Israel, India, and Pakistan have never been signatories of the Treaty, and North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003.
**Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** - The CTBT treaty was thrown open for signature in 1996 by the UNGA. The CTBT has established a global norm against nuclear testing and significantly contributed to the world community's efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is intended to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions. Article-XIV of the Treaty requires ratification by 44 named states, before the Treaty can enter into force. Out of these 44 states, three states - India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not signed the Treaty. China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed but not ratified the Treaty. India was actively engaged in the negotiation of CTBT.

However the final provisions of the treaty did not address Indian concerns on the issues such as Non-proliferation, Global disarmament, Issues concerning to India’s security and strategic autonomy. The treaty is flawed and discriminatory as it favours few nuclear powers.

**India did not sign on these treaties because**-

- These treaties were designed to legitimize, legalize the nuclear capabilities of the nuclear weapon states.
- The treaty was biased and attempted to create nuclear hegemony of few states.
- The treaty divided the world into two groups; nuclear have and nuclear have not.
- While doing so, the treaty allowed nuclear have to maintain their nuclear weapons and created a structural mechanism to prevent nuclear have not from going nuclear.
- These treaties do not include any time bound programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons or for nuclear disarmament. The treaty was not compatible with the Indian goal of complete nuclear disarmament.
- Moreover India wanted to maintain its autonomy in nuclear area. It wanted to keep its nuclear option open and continue fissile material production in the backdrop of volatile security environment in south Asia.
- The NPT has legitimized nuclear arsenals of the NPT states possessing nuclear weapons into perpetuity.
- The NPT is thus a major obstacle to the goal of global nuclear disarmament.
- The provisions of the treaty are contrary to its national interests or infringe on its sovereignty. India has also made it clear that it will not join the NPT as a Non-nuclear weapon state.

**Development of Nuclear deterrence of India** - Today nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security. The nuclear weapons programme of India is officially based on the concept of minimum. However experts note that the concept of minimum deterrence is dynamic and it is difficult to define how much is minimum. According to them this dynamism has contributed in legitimizing the expansion strategies of India. Consequently, there has been steady growth of missiles in India. India has developed several missiles from the 300 km Brahmos to the longer range Agni series.
India have mastered the warhead making technologies and are vigorously continuing to produce more fissile material India’s Ballistic Missiles Arsenals.

According to a recent report of the international panel on the fissile materials cited in a newspaper article, “India has a stock about 560 kg of weapon grade plutonium generated in the spent fuel of its CIRUS and Dhruva reactors. This is good for about 110 warheads. India is also enriching some uranium bit. It is generally agreed that that this is mean for submarine fuel. India has a larger military than Pakistan and it is the midst of a major defence modernization drive. It has prompted Pakistan to lean more heavily on its nuclear deterrent. India is developing cruise missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. At the same time India is working on a new SLBM based on the Agni ballistic missiles.

**Nuclerisation of South Asia: Strategy Implications** - Unleashing an era of nuclear arms race in recent time’s nuclear weapons have played major roles in the strategic considerations of both India and Pakistan. The frequency with which nuclear weapons have been brought into play to manage strategic interests by these countries unleashing dangerous and disturbing trend of arms race. Nuclear arms race constituted by the competitive acquisition of nuclear arms. The enormous destructive power of the nuclear weapons compels adversaries to continually strive to meet the bomb or missile gap exist between them. It can be exemplified by the cold war era nuclear arms between the US and USSR. As a result of arms race, nuclear forces of both US and USSR multiplied in the 1960s and 1970s in a competitive manner, matching each other’s weapons and delivery means, missiles. In May, 1998 India and Pakistan held nuclear test by abandoning nuclear ambiguity for an overt nuclear status. Ever since these tests by India and Pakistan there is a race for competitive acquisition of weapons and delivery means. Today 169 both countries have reportedly enough fissile material to produce several nuclear bombs. In case of nuclear arms race in south Asia, the national security concerns of India and Pakistan vis a-vis each other forced them to acquire sufficiently strong conventional as well as nuclear arms to safeguard their national security interests.

The south Asian arms race which has been triggered in the aftermath of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan resulted into competitive acquisition of missiles and fissionable material for nuclear weapon development by these countries. The deployment of nuclear weapons in India strengthened the position of nuclear advocates in Pakistan and vice versa. While understanding the reasons of this arms race, an analyst observed, India and Pakistan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons were the outcome of cost benefit analyses of presumed benefits of nuclearisation. According to Varun Shahani, “the impact of nuclearisation of south Asia on India and Pakistan has been asymmetric as regards their respective capabilities to use force against each other is concerned. While it has given unlimited freedom to Pakistan to use force against India, it has placed serious constrained on India to do the same against it” (Shahani Varun, “the stability instability paradox: A less than perfect explanation” in E. Sreedharan, ed., India-Pakistan nuclear relationship: theories of deterrence and international Relations. Arms race always
results into increase in defence budgets and cost dearly to the participating actors. It forces the participants in race to spend vast amount of money to compete in the arms race.

The military expenditure of India and Pakistan has increased considerably in last one decade. Presently India is spending about 3 percent of GDP or $ 30 billion annually on defence. India will reportedly spend $ 80 billion on defence equipments in the next ten years. Interestingly, in case of India and Pakistan it is important to note that the nuclear deterrence capability has not kept cap on their spending on conventional arms. India and Pakistan’s conventional weapons imports shows steady incline. Their defence budget rises year on year. Given the present hostility, both the countries are expected to remain voracious consumers of defence equipment for foreseeable future. The continuous expansion of nuclear arsenals by India and Pakistan has triggered the fear of nuclear arms race in the subcontinent and has added fuel to the already troubled relations between these two countries. As a result of this arms race, the basic and enduring risk in South Asia, as pointed out by security analysts, is that the nuclear war will erupt through miscalculation, through pre-emption, or through sudden escalation. Expert further believes that, nuclear weapons deployment by these countries has heightened the chances of an intentional or inadvertent nuclear exchange. It is important to recall at this juncture the warning given by the former CIA Director James Woolsey ways back in 1993. In his testimony before the US Senate he stated, “The arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons.” Hence, there is pressing need for these countries to engage into composite dialogue to break ongoing stalemate. Only continuous dialogue can dissuade India and Pakistan from deploying further nuclear weapons.